Comprehensive Peace Agreement
|January 9, 2005|
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (or CPA), also known as the Naivasha Agreement, was a set of agreements culminating in January 2005 that were signed between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Government of Sudan. The Naivasha Agreement was meant to end the Second Sudanese Civil War, develop democratic governance countrywide and share oil revenues. It further set a timetable by which Southern Sudan would have a referendum on its independence.
The peace process was encouraged by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), as well as IGAD-Partners, a consortium of donor countries.
Ali Osman Taha and John Garang
|EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS|
More than a year after it was signed, Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) is showing signs of strain. While the agreement ended one of Africa’s longest and bloodiest civil wars, it was an agreement between only two parties, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), and continues to lack broader support throughout the country, particularly in the North. The current equation for peace in Sudan is a worrying one: the NCP has the capacity to implement but lacks the political will, whereas the SPLM has the commitment but is weak and disorganised. There is a real risk of renewed conflict down the road unless the NCP begins to implement the CPA in good faith, and the SPLM becomes a stronger and more effective implementing partner. The international community, which has largely abandoned the political engagement and commitment that was so crucial to achieving the peace agreement in the first place, must forcefully reengage with the process to ensure the agreement’s successful implementation.
The implementation process has been an uphill battle, with the NCP exploiting the gaps within the CPA and the weaknesses of its junior partner, the SPLM, to delay and frustrate the process. Following the death of SPLM Chairman Dr. John Garang in July 2005, the SPLM vision has blurred, and the NCP has abandoned its strategy for a political partnership with the SPLM. It is increasingly clear that if this does not change soon, then all peaceful paths forward in Sudan – full implementation of the CPA, comprehensive political solutions to the conflicts in Darfur and the East – will likely lead to eventual regime change and an ousting of the NCP either via free and fair elections, or by simply whittling away its control of the structures of government to a minority stake.
Under growing pressure, the NCP is attempting to manage all these challenges to ensure its own political survival. It has largely succeeded in keeping the international community at bay over Darfur by facilitating increased chaos on the ground and promoting divisions within the rebels. It is achieving a similar containment of the international community on the CPA by selectively implementing elements of the agreement without allowing for any weakening of its grip on power or fundamental change in the way the country is governed. Yet these strategies are not sustainable, and will ultimately lead to renewed or increased conflict. The NCP must begin to implement the agreement in good faith to help assure its political future in a peaceful Sudan by making partnership an attractive option to the SPLM, and unity an attractive option to southern Sudanese.
The SPLM is facing enormous challenges which are severely undermining its ability to function as an effective partner in government. The SPLM faces two simultaneous tasks: as the lead party in the new autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), and the minority partner in the new Government of National Unity (GNU). Wracked by internal divisions and contradictions, and with no functional party structures or party decision-making mechanisms from mid-July 2005 through late February 2006, the SPLM has been completely overwhelmed thus far, unable to successfully or consistently challenge the NCP on most issues relating to implementation. This is most apparent in Khartoum, where the minority SPLM controls only a handful of Ministerial or State Ministerial positions, as well as the 1st Vice-President position, but does not yet have any members integrated into the national civil service or other national institutions. As a result, it has been losing an uphill battle to implement the CPA and begin to change the policies of a government that still faces active civil wars in the East and West.
The SPLM is faring better in the South, as the GoSS slowly inches forward in the face of enormous physical and structural challenges. The 8 January Juba Declaration to integrate the bulk of the government-aligned southern armed groups operating within the umbrella South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) into the SPLA will help consolidate peace in the South, though implementation of the agreement will be difficult. Yet the GoSS is also facing some acute threats, most noticeably from the lack of progress on reorganising the SPLA into a professional army, and the extended delays in paying its troops and civil servants. These delays are creating an environment exploited by the Ugandan rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), which is allegedly still receiving support from the Sudan Armed Forces and has significantly expanded its activities in Western Equatoria, threatening to become a home-grown Sudanese problem.
However, there are early signs that the SPLM is beginning to overcome some of its internal challenges and refocus its efforts on implementation of the CPA. Without a functioning and effective SPLM, there is little chance that the CPA will hold.
In the face of all of this, the international community has remained largely silent. Heavy on monitoring but weak on follow-through, the international community – particularly the key countries involved in the negotiation of the CPA – has not yet embraced its role as a guarantor of the CPA, and continues to lack a consistent, coordinated approach to dealing with the parties, particularly the NCP, let alone holding them to their respective commitments. More consistent, proactive and forceful engagement by the international community is another required ingredient to see this agreement peacefully through the pitfalls that lie ahead.
ON THE DELAYS IN IMPLEMENTATION
To the National Congress Party and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement:
1. Immediately reconstitute the National Constitutional Review Commission with the proper mandate to retroactively review all new bodies and legal acts related to the implementation of the CPA and ensure that they comply with the CPA and the Interim National Constitution.
To the UN, World Bank, U.S., UK, Norway, Italy, other Donor Countries and IGAD Member States:
2. Work to improve international coordination and strategies around the implementation process by forming a Technical Secretariat attached to the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, preferably headed by General Sumbeiywo, to track implementation and act as a central information clearinghouse for the international community on information relating to the CPA.
3. Link donor funding, both bilateral and through the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, to the implementation records of the parties, as determined by the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, and develop clear benchmarks tied to future funding for the parties to achieve in Khartoum and Juba.
4. Channel financial support and technical expertise in the short-term to combat the greatest immediate threats to the CPA, by funding and helping to operationalise key commissions such as the Ad Hoc North-South Boundary Commission, the National Petroleum Commission, and the National Civil Service Commission; and neutralise potential spoilers by supporting the implementation of the Juba Declaration.
To the National Congress Party:
5. Immediately cease all inflammatory rhetoric designed to mobilise the Misseriya people against the Ngok Dinka and the Abyei Boundary Commission Report, and cease efforts to unconstitutionally administer Abyei from Southern Kordofan State.
6. President Bashir should immediately appoint the Local Executive Council for Abyei, in consultation with 1st Vice-President Kiir and Vice-President Taha, in accordance with the CPA.
To the UN Mission in Sudan:
7. If the stalemate on Abyei continues and the formation of an administration is not forthcoming, UNMIS should seek to set up a temporary administration in Abyei, while facilitating discussions between the SPLM and NCP, and between the Ngok Dink and Misseriya peoples, on the following:
(a) definition of citizenship and residency in Abyei, based on the CPA, the Abyei Boundary Commission Report, and the situation on the ground;
(b) implementation of the Abyei Boundary Commission report in light of demographic changes on the ground;
(c) developing guarantees for nomadic grazing rights in and through Abyei; and
(d) scenario planning should Abyei vote to join an independent South, including:
i. discussions on provisions for dual citizenship for residents of the area;
ii. protection of traditional grazing rights for non-residents of Abyei; and
iii. discussions between the SPLM and NCP on the longer-term sharing of oil revenue from Abyei between North and South.
ON PROBLEMS IN THE OIL SECTOR
To the NCP:
8. Immediately provide the SPLM with access to existing oil contracts and full oil production and revenue information, as required by the CPA.
9. Cease blocking the establishment of an effective National Petroleum Commission with the mandate agreed upon in the CPA.
To the SPLM and Government of Southern Sudan:
10. Immediately cancel all oil agreements in the South signed in violation of the CPA.
11. Take steps to ensure that the rights of citizens in oil producing areas are being protected.
To the International Community:
12. Provide the SPLM with the technical expertise and information, as required, to help it attain its fair share of oil revenue, and develop the capacity to manage the oil sector in the South.
TO ADDRESS SPLM AND SPLA CONSTRAINTS
To the SPLM:
13. Work to resolve internal divisions and contradictions, and immediately move to begin rebuilding party structures, working towards an SPLM national convention, in order to be a more effective partner in the implementation process.
To the SPLA:
14. Take immediate steps to develop a common internal approach on the reorganisation of the SPLA. Prioritise the reorganisation of the army, together with a transparent and accountable salary structure, in order to help improve security in the South and combat the growing threat posed by the LRA.
To the U.S., UK, Norway, Italy, other Donor Countries and IGAD Member States:
15. Provide the SPLM with financial and technical support, as needed, for it to help re-establish functioning party structures and be a positive force for peace in Sudan.
16. Provide the SPLA with technical and financial support to help it reorganise its forces, integrate the SSDF troops who have joined the SPLA, and develop a professional standing army, capable of combating security threats in the South such as the LRA. In the case of the U.S., consider legislative exemption for the GoSS from anti-terrorist sanctions, on a year-by-year basis.
17. Support the implementation of the Juba Declaration by providing food aid and transport, as necessary, to help counter the efforts by the NCP’s military intelligence to rebuild its southern militias as spoilers in the South.
ON THE LRA
To the SPLM/A:
18. Urgently reorganise the SPLA and develop a targeted military strategy to counter the LRA’s growing presence in Equatoria, including through necessary support from the international community.
19. Cease to pursue its own mediation efforts, and instead coordinate with and support the existing initiative led by Ugandan mediator Betty Bigombe.
To the NCP and the Sudan Armed Forces:
20. Cease all support to the LRA in southern Sudan.
To the UN Security Council:
21. Without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Sudanese authorities, direct UNMIS to use all necessary means to fulfil its mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence and require UNMIS to act proactively and robustly against the LRA, including in a preemptive manner.
22. Appoint a panel of independent experts to investigate the membership, funding of, and support for the LRA. The panel should consult with relevant governments, UN missions, and other UN-appointed expert bodies. It should advise the Security Council on further measures to be taken by the Council in relation to the LRA.
To the UN Mission in Sudan:
23. Establish a verification unit, to be negotiated directly with the SPLA and the Sudan Armed Forces, to verify continued SPLA claims of Sudan Armed Forces’ support to the LRA.
Nairobi/Brussels, 31 March 2006